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IPO Underpricing in the Hospitality Industry:  
A Necessary Evil? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Hospitality initial public offerings (IPOs) experienced average first-day price increases of 17.1% 
between January 1981 and December 2001.  This price increase, referred to as IPO 
underpricing, represents a substantial opportunity cost to the owners of the issuing firm.  IPO 
underpricing is a critical consideration for managers of private hospitality firms who are 
considering going public.  The increased liquidity, easier access to equity capital, and other 
benefits that accrue to publicly traded firms must be carefully weighed against the significant cost 
of underpricing.  This paper explains the relationship between the marketing process of IPOs and 
the degree of underpricing.  We test the hypothesis that underpricing is a reward for the 
information revealed by regular investors during the marketing process of the IPO. We explain 
why underpricing is a necessity for managers of private hospitality firms if they choose to go 
public.  For managers of private hospitality firms who are considering taking their firms public, 
our results provide an historical benchmark for the underpricing that they can expect to transfer to 
outside investors which is different from that of the overall market. Beyond benchmarking the 
cost of going public, we test theories that predict underpricing and investigate the use of share 
allocations as an incentive for truth telling.  
 
JEL: G24, G32 
Keywords: IPO underpricing, Information Asymmetry 
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Introduction 
Issuing publicly traded stock for the first time is a highpoint for any company.  
The manager/owner’s motivations for moving forward with an initial public offering 
(IPO) are varied, but, as with most decisions, the manager/owner of a private firm must 
carefully weigh the benefits of an IPO against its costs.  Potential benefits include the 
ability to raise capital in the public markets on more attractive terms than in private 
circles, increased liquidity for managers and other insiders, and increased recognition and 
credibility with other stakeholders.  These benefits, however, come at considerable direct 
and indirect costs.  For U.S. firms, Lee, Lockhead, and Ritter (1996) find that the direct 
costs, such as investment-banking commissions, average about 11.0% of IPO proceeds.  
Less obvious, but often more costly, is an additional indirect cost commonly referred to 
as IPO underpricing.   
IPO underpricing is defined as the IPO’s first day return.  It represents the 
potential lost proceeds generated by the difference in the offer price at which shares are 
initially sold to the public and the closing price after the first day of trading.  Historically, 
IPOs have shown economically significant first-day price increases.  A study of all U.S. 
IPOs over 1980 to 2000 by Loughran and Ritter (2002), for example, documents an 
average first-day return of 18.9 percent. Zheng and Strangeland (2007) find an average 
first-day return of 12.91 percent over the period 1982-1998.  Krigman, et al (1999) 
further show that these returns are not given back in the first year of the IPO. They 
estimated an average first day return of 12.3 percent over the 1988-1995 period. Ritter 
and Welch (2002) confirm the result that there is a significantly positive return over a 
three-year holding period following the IPO . In sum, for the overall market, there is 
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widespread evidence of significantly positive first-day returns and prices increase and 
stay high following the IPO.  
Since early work by Stoll and Curley (1970), Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975), 
the empirical regularity of significant first-day IPO returns have typically been referred to 
as “IPO underpricing” because of the wealth consequences for private owners who decide 
to go public, selling part or all of their firms to outside investors.  To illustrate, consider 
an IPO with, say, an offer price of $10.00 and a first-day closing price of $11.89.  The 
$1.89 underpricing represents a one-day return of 18.9 percent for investors who bought 
shares at the offer price.  From the original owner’s viewpoint, however, company shares 
were sold for less than they were worth.  Although the capital markets value the shares at 
$11.89, the original owners only receive the $10.00 offer price (less, of course, fees paid 
to the underwriter).  This transaction with typical underpricing raises an interesting 
question:  Why do private owners give away such a large proportion of their firms’ value 
to outside investors in the process of going public?   
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) provide an answer.  In their well-known theoretical 
model of the firm-commitment IPO process typically used in the United States, 
underpricing is critical to overcoming information asymmetries between private firm 
managers/owners and potential investors in the public capital markets.  More specifically, 
their model shows that underpricing is an economic necessity as it entices “smart money” 
investors to truthfully participate in the price-setting process.   
Although Strangeland and Zheng (2007) find that IPO underpricing may be 
affected by industry-specific characteristics, there is a small amount of work related to 
IPOs in the hospitality industry. Gu (1996) studies IPOs in the gaming sector and finds 
3  
that they under-perform in the long run. His study, however, does not explicitly model 
and investigate underpricing. Atkinson and LeBruto (1995) also focus their attention on 
the gaming industry and find a substantial underpricing of 30.63%, though they do not 
posit reasons for why and do not model the price-setting process. However, these results 
provide evidence that differences exist between the degree of underpricing for the overall 
market and for specific industries.  As a result, it is informative to estimate the degree of 
undepricing in the hospitality industry and to test the theoretical model of Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989).  Canina (1996) and Canina and Gibson (2003) study the entire hospitality 
industry. Together, they document underpricing in IPOs and show that the long-run 
performance of hospitality IPOs are higher than that of the average company in the 
overall market. However, they do not formally model the underpricing phenomenon or 
the price-setting process and do not investigate the share allocation decision, which are 
the focuses of this study. We contribute to this literature by providing evidence that 
underpricing is purposeful, is a necessary component of the IPO process, is incentivized 
through manipulation of share allocation, and is not explained by prevailing market 
conditions. As will be discussed in detail later, our results are consistent with investment 
banks offering a positive first-day return to investors to induce them to reveal their true 
demand for the stock.  In addition, we document the differences in underpricing between 
the overall market and the hospitality sector. The difference is substantial and is 
consistent with our general explanation that underpricing is driven by truthful 
information disclosure during the bookbuilding process. 
In this paper, we test the theoretical predictions of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) 
and others on a sample comprising 123 firm-commitment hospitality IPOs filed between 
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January 1981 and December 2001.  Our efforts, the first ever to test the empirical 
implications of these models in the hospitality industry, serve a twofold purpose.  First, as 
soon will become clear in further discussion of the economic rationale for IPO 
underpricing, predictions emerge about the pattern of underpricing across IPOs.  These 
predictions are derived from the theoretical models of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991).  We design tests of 
these predictions and find that underpricing theories prove consistent with what we 
observe in the hospitality industry.  The overall results for the hospitality sector are 
similar to results of other industries presented in aggregate by Hanley (1993).  However, 
the magnitude of our estimates differ from those in the overall market.  Therefore, since 
the degree of underpicing is different in the hospitality industry as well as for its 
constituent sectors hotels and restaurants, our results also provide an historical 
benchmark for underpricing in the overall hospitality industry as well as for hotels and 
restaurants individually.  Our results thus enable lodging and restaurant manager/owners 
of private hospitality firms to more accurately benchmark the cost of going public.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.  In Section 1, we review the 
theoretical rationale for IPO underpricing and derive testable implications.  We describe 
our data and sample composition in Section 2.  In Section 3, we describe our empirical 
methodology; results are also presented and interpreted.  Concluding remarks are made in 
Section 4.   
 
1. Economic Rationale for Underpricing 
In order to understand the economic rationale for IPO underpricing, first note the 
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important role of the investment bank as the underwriter of the IPO.  This is 
accomplished through a brief review of a landmark study by Akerlof (1970).  Akerlof 
(1970) shows that markets do not work well when asymmetrically informed buyers and 
sellers try to make one-time transactions without the intervention of an intermediary.  If 
buyers cannot verify the quality of a product, they should always believe that a product is 
worth less than the price offered by the seller.  The intuition is quite simple:  if the 
product were worth more than the sale price, why would the seller be willing to part with 
it?  Given that it is a one-time transaction, the seller does not care about damaging his 
reputation and so has nothing to lose.  In this case, buyers who accept the seller’s price 
will always over-pay, thereby inducing buyers to leave the market and, in the worst case, 
for trading to cease.  One plausible remedy is the introduction of a reputable intermediary 
whose job it is to certify value.  The intermediary whose business it is to make repeated 
transactions has her reputation on the line.  As long as the intermediary evaluates 
products honestly, her reputation is protected and her business can continue successfully.   
The relevance of Akerlof’s argument in the IPO market can be illustrated with an 
example.  Consider the market for IPOs in which two equally likely types of IPO issues 
exist: those of good companies worth $20 per share and those of bad companies worth 
$10 per share.  Potential IPO issuers know the value of their company.  Potential 
investors, however, can not discern whether the company is good or bad.  Given that half 
of the issues being offered are from good companies worth $20 per share and half are 
from bad companies worth $10 per share, investors ought to be willing to pay the average 
of $15 per share.  However, the potential issuers of good companies are unwilling to offer 
their shares for $15.  Potential investors understand this reluctance to offer shares of good 
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companies, and thus are only willing to pay $10 per share since they correctly believe 
that they are purchasing the shares of a bad company.  As a result, the market collapses 
with only the shares of the bad company being offered.  
In the IPO market, when investors buy shares of a company, they are purchasing a 
portion of the firm’s future profits: the higher the present value of their expected future 
profits, the more the shares are worth.  However, buyers are obliged to believe that firms 
will over-state their profitability in an effort to inflate prices and thus require an impartial 
third party, the investment bank, to confirm the firms’ claims.  Potential IPO firms that 
indeed have positive prospects will seek out and pay for reputable intermediaries who 
will research the firm and communicate honest evaluations to prospective buyers.  
Potential IPO firms with shabby prospects cannot approach these intermediaries for fear 
of being uncovered.  In this manner, poor quality IPOs are filtered out and intermediaries 
take on the role of information accumulators.   
Investment banks in their role as an underwriting of the IPO serve as a reputable 
intermediary during the underwriting process.  This process consists of two parts.  The 
purpose of the first part is to provide credible information to the investors useful for 
evaluating the value and riskiness of the firm.  This involves the development of the 
“prospectus” by auditors and analysts from the investment bank in conjunction with the 
management of the issuing firm.  The prospectus, which is delivered to outside investors, 
comprehensively describes the issuing firm’s business, including its future plans, 
financial history, and potential risks.  Investors have faith that the information contained 
in the prospectus is accurate because the investment bank has its reputation on the line.  
Banks have the incentive to report this information honestly in order to maintain its 
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professional reputation and ensure future business.  The investment bank is in the 
business of underwriting IPOs.  If the investment bank misrepresents a firm’s prospects 
in the prospectus, its future underwriting business suffers.   
The bank is responsible for setting a price at which cynicism in the market is 
offset by verifiable expectations of future performance for the firm.  The offer price set 
by the underwriter must simultaneously compensate investors for accepting the risk 
inherent in being on the losing end of information asymmetry and raise the maximum 
amount of capital for the IPO firm.  This rationale is the basis of the theoretical models 
developed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and, Spatt 
and Srivastava (1991), and it suggests that it is this balancing act that is the impetus to 
IPO underpricing.   
In order to raise the desired amount of capital for the issuing firm investors must 
be willing to reveal their true valuation during the second part of the underwriting process 
referred to as the bookbuilding process.  Investors would like to pay the lowest price 
possible but in order to maintain their reputation as a credible underwriter the investment 
bank must raise the maximum amount of capital for the IPO issuing firm.  Investors have 
accurate information on which to base their valuation through the prospectus, but they do 
not have the incentive to disclose voluntarily what they think the shares are worth.  
Investors have the incentive to keep their valuation private and attempt to lowball their 
offers in the hope of keeping the offer price low.   
The bookbuilding process occurs during the “road show”, and it is designed to get 
the most that it can for the firm that is represents in the going-public process.  During the 
“road show” the underwriter communicates its findings to the public and attempts to 
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extract from the public what it is willing to pay for the IPO issue.  The investment bank’s 
objective is to get investors to reveal truthfully their private valuations and to set the IPO 
offer price according to those valuations. 
The theoretical work of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm 
(1990) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991) posits that underpricing serves to motivate 
investors to reveal truthful indications of interest.  The simple intuition is that by 
allowing investors to receive a positive return by setting the offer price below the true 
price, one can induce investors to participate in the bookbuilding process.  The 
bookbuilding process is designed for just that.  Specifically, prior to bookbuilding , the 
underwriting bank sets a range of possible offer prices called a “filing range,” say $11 to 
$13 a share.  Ostensibly, this $11 to $13 range represents the investment bank’s best 
estimate of what the final offer price will be but is in no way binding.  The investment 
bank and issuing firm then conduct a “road show” where the firm is presented to major 
investors, sometimes called regular investors or a selling group.  Investors may then 
indicate how many shares they would like to buy at a price of $9, $11, $13, $15, and so 
on.  These non-binding bids are collected in a “book,” hence the term “bookbuilding.”  
Upon completion of the road show, the investment bank analyzes the book and sets the 
offer price and allocation of shares.  If the investment bank is successful in acquiring 
truthful indications of interest, that is, a reliable representation of aggregate demand, it 
will be able to estimate with a high degree of accuracy the price at which shares will sell 
once they begin to trade in the public capital markets.   
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model this process and show that the following set 
of rules will induce investors to reveal their demand truthfully: 
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1. Indications of interest are not binding hence investors are not forced to 
purchase in the case that the IPO fails.  Moreover, they will not feel “trapped” 
in case future information renders their original bids too aggressive. 
2. All investors get their shares at an identical offer price.  This helps to ensure 
that investors are not discouraged from offering a high price.  
3. Investors that make stronger indications of interest receive a greater allocation 
of shares.  Investors who bid high are offered more shares to provide incentive 
for them not to low-ball.  Thus, if one feels an IPO will be strong, they will 
bid a high price.  They are insured the same price as everyone else (rule 2) but 
will receive more shares as a reward. 
4. The offer price is related to the strength and breadth of interest: the stronger 
the overall indications of interest, the higher the offer price.  In other words, 
the offer price reflects the information revealed in bookbuilding.  
5. The investment bank maintains a direct link between anticipated underpricing 
(i.e., the anticipated first-day return) and the overall strength of the book: the 
stronger the overall indications of interest, the greater the underpricing.  If 
interest is high and the offer price is set high (rule 4), the investment bank 
must ensure that all investors will receive a fair return once the firm goes IPO. 
Otherwise, the next time the bank approaches investors, they will be unwilling 
to truthfully reveal their interest, knowing that in doing so, offer price will rise 
and their return will fall.  Only in ensuring that the first-day return is 
proportional to the offer price can investment banks prove to investors that 
they will be not be punished for revealing their information.  
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These rules are critical to building a book containing truthful indications of 
interest by which the investment bank determines the offer price and allocation of shares. 
Only if all five of these criteria are met, will investors reveal their true valuations of all 
deals, regardless of the quality of the deal itself.  Recent work by Bubna and Prabhala 
(2007) investigates a large number of IPO books directly and finds that this process 
indeed serves to uncover truthful signals of interest and hence price.  Lin et al (2003) 
further find that bookbuilding simultaneously rewards investors for truth-telling while 
also reducing total underpricing, in essence benefiting both investors and issuing firms. 
In order to get a better idea of how these rules induce an investor to reveal a 
truthful indication of interest, consider how an investor would respond to the set of rules 
when asked by the investment bank for his indication of interest.  Suppose that all the 
regular investors like the deal.  If they all truthfully submit a strong indication of interest, 
then the investment bank will increase the offer price (rule 4) and allocate each the 
appropriate number of shares based upon the relative strength of their indication of 
interest (rule 3).  Since all the regular investors submitted truthful indications of interest 
in this scenario then the investment bank has a good estimate of the price at which the 
shares will sell once they begin trading.  The investment bank simply sets the offer price 
below this estimated market value to underprice the issue (rule 5).  Each investor profits 
by telling the truth because they are allocated shares at the same offer price (rule 2) that 
has intentionally been set below the expected market price.   
Suppose that an investor deviates from the other investors and lies by submitting a 
weak indication of interest.  The weak indication of interest will result in a weaker book 
and a lower offer price (rule 4) but this investor will not be allocated shares (rule 3).  So 
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this investor is shut out of the deal rather than profiting by telling the truth.   
Let us now examine the situation in which all the investors dislike the deal and 
truthfully submit weak indications of interest.  The investment bank once again knows 
the market price at which the shares will sell once they begin trading.  Clearly the weak 
book points to a market price at the lower part of the initial offer range or perhaps, for 
very weak books, below the range.  With a weak book, the investment banker does not 
underprice the issue and sets the offer price close to this market price.  Each of the 
regular investors will be asked to buy a number of shares at this offer price.  Moreover, 
the investors may be asked to hold a portion of their shares for a period after the issue.  
Honoring the request will not, on average, generate excess losses since shares are bought 
at a fair market price, but it will not generate excess profits either.  Why not deny the 
request to buy and hold shares?  The repeated nature of the IPO game once again plays a 
critical role.  As pointed out by Sherman (2000), if a regular investor refuses to buy and 
hold shares in a weak IPO, the investment banker can rescind her membership in the 
“club” of regular investors.  Of course, a loss of club membership would be costly going 
forward, as the investor’s ability to profit from her information would be severely 
impaired.   
Now suppose that an investor instead deviates from the other investors and lies by 
submitting a strong indication of interest.  In that case, she may be rewarded by a request 
to buy and hold even more shares in the weak IPO.  As for deals an investor likes, she is 
best served by telling the truth for deals she dislikes. 
The bookbuilding process is thus what a financial economist calls a “truth-telling 
mechanism.”  To tell the truth about what they think of the deal is in investors’ best 
12  
interest.  Recognize that underpricing the issue when the overall book is strong is critical 
to truth telling.  To see this, consider an investor’s incentive in the scenario posed above 
if instead of underpricing the issue when the book is strong, the investment bank sets an 
offer price exactly equal to the market price predicted by the book.  Without 
underpricing, if an investor tells the truth by indicating that she likes the deal, she is 
allocated shares but pays exactly what they are worth.  So, by telling the truth, she does 
not profit.  She is better off lying in the hope of driving down the offer price and picking 
up shares at depressed prices in the market once they begin to trade.  Without 
underpricing, regular investors have no reason to participate in the bookbuilding process. 
The important stipulation is that, in order to induce truth-telling, banks must 
under-price strong IPOs and not weak ones, thereby generating incentives to indicating 
strength only in the case of a strong demand.  Evidence presented by Smith and Kutsuna 
(2000) indeed find that participants in bookbuilding are better off than those who are not 
and that bookbuilding ultimately enhances value for both large and small issuers. 
The empirical implication of Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model is that 
changes in the offer price between the filing of the prospectus and the offer date are a 
result of information gathered by underwriters from investors during the bookbuilding 
period.  Recall from our earlier discussion that the offer price and allocation chosen by 
the investment bank is related to the strength and breadth of interest demonstrated during 
the bookbuilding effort.  The stronger are the overall indications of interest, the higher is 
the offer price and the higher is the allocation.  The strength of the book will thus 
manifest itself in how the offer price is set relative to the filing range.  A strong book is 
evidenced by an offer price that is set above the filing range.  Similarly, a weak book is 
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evidenced by an offer price that is set below the filing range.  Also recall that the 
investment bank provides regular investors with an incentive to reveal truthfully their 
demand for an issue by maintaining a direct link between both anticipated underpricing 
and allocation and the overall strength of the book.  The stronger is the book, the greater 
is the underpricing and the greater is the allocation.   
Putting all of the above together, we have the following testable empirical 
implications:  
1. A strong (weak) book should generate an offer price that is set high (low) and 
should be coupled with a large (small) underpricing. 
2. A strong (weak) bid in the bookbuilding process should accompany a large 
(small) allocation of shares. 
In other words, underpricing should be greatest when the offer price is set above the 
filing range and lowest when the offer price is set below the filing range; and the 
percentage change in the number of shares offered relative to the number of shares filed 
in the preliminary prospectus should be greatest when the offer price is set above the 
filing range and lowest when the offer price is set below the filing range.  These are the 
two empirical implications of the theoretical models first developed by Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) that are tested in this study. 
 
2.  Data and Sample Construction  
Our dataset of hospitality IPOs draws from two sources: the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) and the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).  The total 
sample consists of 123 firm-commitment hospitality IPOs filed between January 1981 
and December 2001.  SDC reports company and offering characteristics including the 
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underwriter, the initial offer price filing range reported in the prospectus, the number of 
shares filed in the prospectus, the final offer price, and the number of shares offered.  The 
sample does not include IPOs with an offer price less than $5.00.  Issues that have 
missing values for the high offer price, the low offer price, the number of shares filed, or 
the number of shares offered are excluded from the data sample.  The CRSP database 
provides  the closing price on the first trading day for each IPO necessary to calculate the 
first-day return and, hence, underpricing.  
We separate our hospitality sample of IPOs into restaurant and hotel sub-groups 
using each firm’s Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code.  The SIC “Restaurant” 
classification is narrow in scope, whereas the SIC “Hotel” classification is more broadly 
defined to include hotel management/ownership firms, gaming firms, and cruise lines.  
Our sample includes 91 restaurant firms and 32 hotel firms.  Table 1 reports the number 
of IPOs, and the average value of IPOs in thousands of dollars by year and over various 
periods for the hospitality sector as a whole and for the restaurant and hotel sectors 
separately.  Except for 1988, 1990, and 2000, at least one hospitality firm went public 
every year from 1981 through 2001, with particularly active years in the early-to-mid 
80’s and the mid 90’s.  Slowdowns in IPOs seem to coincide with weakness in the overall 
stock market pursuant to market crashes in 1987 and 2000.  When examined separately, 
the Restaurant and Hotel IPO markets appear to share periods of activity and inactivity in 
terms of both number of IPOs and total value offered.  Hotel firms that went public 
raised, on average, almost three times as much per IPO as restaurant firms , but Hotel 
IPOs are far less frequent, particularly in the first decade of our dataset.  A total of nearly 
$4 billion was raised in 123 IPOs over the course of 21 years.  
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3.  Empirical Evidence 
3.1. Initial Filing Range Accuracy 
Reputational concerns on the part of investment banks imply that the initial filing 
range reported in the prospectus for the offer price is an unbiased assessment of the 
eventual offer price at which shares will be offered to regular investors.  In other words, 
filings ranges should not be systematically high or low relative to the final offer price.  If 
it were, investors would quickly learn of this and adjust their bidding appropriately.  For 
example, if an investment bank consistently sets the initial filing range too high, investors 
will always bid lower than the initial filing range, knowing that the filing range is too 
high.  As such, investment banks wishing to maintain a reputation of honest valuation 
should seek to set an initial filing range that is unbiased.  To test whether investment 
banks that underwrite hospitality IPOs do indeed set an unbiased filing range on average, 
we conduct statistical tests used to address the biasness of an estimator.  This is 
accomplished by testing whether or not the mean difference between the mid-point of the 
filing range and the offer price, referred to as the offer price revision, equals zero.  The 
mid-point of the filing range is used as an estimate of the expected offer price.  For every 
IPO in our sample we compute the difference between the offer price and the mid point 
of the filing range and then compute the mean of the difference.  We then use the t-
statistic in order to determine whether the mean difference is statistically different from 
zero.  In addition, we tested the mean percentage difference between the two.  
Specifically, let OP  represent the offer price set at completion of the road show 
and MP  represent the mid-point of the filing range L H(P ,  P )  reported in the prospectus 
16  
where LP  and HP  are the lowest and highest prices in the filing range, respectively.  If the 
filing range is unbiased, then on average the offer price revision, OP - MP  should be 
insignificantly different from zero.  By analogy, ( )O M
M
P P
P
−
 is the difference between 
the offer price and the midpoint of the filing range in percentage terms, referred to as the 
percentage offer price revision.  The average value for each of these measures was 
computed by first computing the value for each IPO and then averaging this value across 
IPOs.  For example, for the mean percentage offer price revision, first the percentage 
difference was computed for each IPO and then the average was taken of these computed 
values across the IPOs.   
Table 2 shows the values of various variables of interest related to the 
determination of whether the initial filing offer range reported in the prospectus is an 
unbiased assessment of the final offer price in which shares are offered to regular 
investors.  The values are reported for the hospitality industry as a whole in Panel A, as 
well as for two subsamples: restaurants, Panel B, and hotels, Panel C.  For each of these 
three data samples – hospitality, restaurants and hotels, the results are presented across all 
IPOs in Column (1).  In addition, in order to get a sense of the relationship between the 
final offer price and the filing range, Table 2 also reports the same information for three 
subsamples of the IPOs categorized based upon the relationship between the final offer 
price and the filing range.  The three categories were defined as: the “Below” group 
where the final offer price was set below the low of the filing offer range; the “Within” 
group where the final offer price was set between the low and the high of the offer range; 
and the “Above” group where the final offer price was set above the high of the offer 
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range.  For illustrative purposes, consider an IPO with a filing range of $15 to $17.  The 
three categories represent a final offer price below $15, between $15 and $17, and above 
$17.  The IPOs included in Column (2) represent those in which the offer price was set 
below the offer range (henceforth “Below”); Column (3) represent those in which the 
offer price was set within the offer range (henceforth “Within”); and Column (4) 
represent those in which the offer price was set above the offer range (henceforth 
“Above”).  
The mean offer price revision is insignificantly different from zero as shown in 
Table 2, Column (1).  For the hospitality industry as a whole, the average value is -$0.11; 
for the restaurant sector it is -$0.16; and, for the hotel sector is $0.13.  The low t-statistics 
indicate that the difference is insignificantly different from zero.  Although investment 
banks’ filing range estimates, on average, were slightly high for restaurant firms and 
slightly low for hotel firms, the lack of statistical significance in the test of the differences 
suggests that investment banks were not systematically biased in setting the filing range.  
The empirical evidence is thus consistent with the theory that the initial filing range 
contained in the prospectus is an unbiased estimate of the final offer price.   
The results presented in Table 2 for each of the three hospitality subsamples, the 
“Below”, Within” and “Above” groups, provide further evidence that supports the result 
that the filing offer range is an unbiased estimate of the final offer price.  Investigation of 
the percentage of IPOs with a final offer price that falls below, within, and above the 
filing range lends further credence to the results presented above.  The variable entitled 
percentage of IPOs shows that about half of the time investment banks were successful in 
setting a filing range which encompassed the final offer price.  Of the 123 total 
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hospitality IPOs, 64 had a final offer price within the initial filing range, which represents 
52% of all deals.  In 32 instances or 26% of all deals the offer price was below the range  
and 27 times or 22% it was above.  Moreover, the magnitude of the average dollar offer 
price revisions and average percentage offer price revisions are symmetric when the offer 
price is below the offer range and for when the offer price is above the offer range.1  For 
the “Below” group the average dollar revision was -$2.55 while for the “Above” group 
this value was $2.77. Again, there is no evidence of bias here.  
These findings are mirrored in each of the two industries: 49.0% of the time the 
offer price was within the range for Restaurants and 59.0% of the time for Hotels.  The 
percentage of IPOs in the “Above” vs “Below” groups are 22% vs 29%  and 22% vs 19% 
for Restaurants and Hotels respectively.  Again, these findings show that the “Above” 
and “Below” groups are roughly the same size.  In addition, the absolute value of the 
magnitude of the mean offer price revision are similar for the “Above” and “Below” 
groups. The results when  the hotel and restaurant sectors were analyzed separately 
provide further evidence that the filing range is unbiased.   
Overall, our results suggest that investment banks were unbiased in setting initial 
filing ranges for the hospitality industry overall and for the hotel and restaurant sectors.  
Our qualitative conclusion about the biasness of range-setting behavior is similar to that 
of Jenkinson et al (2003), who study European IPOs.  Jenkinson et al (2003) find that 
European IPOs were rarely priced outside of initial filing ranges, concluding that 
European investment banks were unbiased when setting the ranges. 
                                                     
1
 The conclusions for the dollar offer price revision and the percentage offer price revision are consistent.  
As a result, only the dollar offer price revision results are discussed henceforth.   
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3.2.  IPO Underpricing and Demand Revelation   
Now, let us turn our attention to underpricing, where underpricing is defined as 
the first-day IPO return.  If underpricing is an incentive for truthful revelation of 
information, it should be positive for all IPOs according to rule 5 .  However, it should be 
most significantly so for IPOs with strong demand and for which bookbuilding has 
generated a high offer price relative to the offer range, rule 5.  Let the first-day return be 
defined as follows where OP  is the final offer price and 1P  is the closing price on the first 
day of trading:  
1 0 0First day return = (  - ) /  P P P  
Table 3 presents findings regarding first-day IPO returns.  The average first-day return 
for the entire Hospitality sector and the Restaurant and Hotel subgroups as shown in 
Column (1) are consistently positive (about 17%) and all statistically different from zero 
(with p-values less than 1% in each case).2  For the hospitality sector as a whole, the 
underpricing is larger and significantly so when the offer price is above the filing range 
(strong demand).  Indeed, when the offer price was within or above the filing range, the 
underpricing was positive and significantly so, 14% and 39% respectively.  When the 
offer price was below the filing range, the underpricing, 4.64% is not statistically 
different from zero.  The F-statistic of 19.06 confirms that the means of each category, 
above, within, or below filing range, are significantly different.  An additional test, the t-
test (t-statistic of 5.49), shows that the difference between the above- and below-filing 
range underpricings is likewise large (almost 35%) and statistically significant.  This 
                                                     
2
 We test whether underpricing is related to market conditions at the time of the IPO and find that they are 
not significantly related. In other words, positive first-day returns are not explained by strong market 
conditions. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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observed pattern of first-day returns is consistent with the theory that underpricing is the 
price or the reward paid to regular investors for truthful revelation of demand.  That is, 
IPOs with strong demand (the “Above” group), during bookbuilding, result in high offer 
prices relative to the offer range, rule 4, and reward investors with the largest first-day 
return, rule 5.  We found that the highest underpricing of 39.41 % occurred when the 
offer price was set above the offer range, rule 5.  The second highest degree of 
underpricing of 13.92% occurred for IPOs in which the offer price was set within the 
filing range (the “Within” group), rule 5.  While the group with the weakest demand (the 
“Below” group), those with essentially no underpricing are found for the group of IPOs 
in which the offer price is set below the offer range, rule 5.  This pattern of underpricing 
in which the highest level of underpricing occurs for the IPOs in which the offer price 
was set above the filing range and the lowest level occurs for those below the filing range 
is consistent with the rules used by the investment bank during the bookbuilding process.3 
The caveat seems to be the industry-specific investigation of the Hotel industry. 
For the hotel sample, the differences in initial returns among each of these three 
categories is weakly significant as determined by the F-statistic, but pair-wise tests do not 
show that the “Above” underpricing exceeds the “Below”.  Though the difference is still 
quite large, almost 25%, this is not statistically significant, due mostly to the small size of 
the “Below” sample and the resulting lack of statistical power extracted.  
In addition, Table 3 reports the percentage of IPOs with first-day returns greater 
than zero.  When an investment bank sets the offer price above the file range, the first-
                                                     
3
 If underpricing tended to be reversed in subsequent periods, the relation between first-day returns and 
later returns would be negative. However, consistent with the findings of Krigman et al (1999) and Ritter 
and Welch (2002), we find here that underpricing is persistent as first-day returns are not significantly 
related to subsequent returns at either the weekly or annual horizon. Detailed results are available upon 
request. 
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day return was greater than zero in every instance.  This suggests that after building the 
book, investment banks purposefully set the offer price lower than what they believe the 
fair market price to be, even after raising the offer price in accordance with revealed 
demand.  If underpricing were not purposeful, one might expect that, from time to time, 
banks would increase the offer price so much as to result in zero or negative underpricing 
from time to time.  This study finds not a single instance of this in the above-filing-range 
category.  As such, we conclude the significantly positive underpricing of that category is 
purposeful.  
Table 4 shows a comparison of the average underpricing for the overall market, 
the casino industry and the hospitality industry over various periods.  The periods 
correspond to those of the previous studies.  For example, Strangeland and Zheng (2007) 
analyzed IPOs for the overall market for the 1982-1988 period.  In order to provide a 
valid comparison, we computed the average underpricing for hospitality IPOs over the 
same period (presented in column 4).  It is evident that the degree of underpricing is 
consistently higher in the hospitality sector than it is in the overall market.  Strangeland 
and Zheng (2007) document an average underpricing of 12.91 percent for the overall 
market while for the hospitality sector it is 17.47 percent over the 1982-1988 period. 
Similarly over the 1990-1998 period, Loughran and Ritter provide evidence of an average 
underpricing of 14.8 percent whereas for the hospitality IPOs it is 22.14 percent over the 
same time period.  The same pattern emerges when the reference group is the casino 
industry.  Atkinson and LeBruto (1995) found that the average underpricing for casino IPOs 
during the years 1992-1993 was 30.63 percent.  The average underpricing for hospitality stocks 
was 36.77 percent over that same two year period.  As a result of the industry specific differences, 
it is important for hospitality managers to use the historical average for the hospitality industry as 
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the benchmark when evaluating the costs associated with going public. 
The same pattern emerges when the average underpricing is examined for each of the 
groups categorized according to the final offer price relative to the filing range.  As shown in 
Table 5, Hanley (1993) found that the average underpricing of IPOs in the overall market with 
and offer price less than, within, and above the filing range was 0.6 percent, 10.00 percent and 
20.70 percent over the 1983-1987 period.  Whereas, for hospitality IPOs the average underpricing 
was 0.32 percent, 11.89 percent and 30.26 percent respectively over that same period.  Once 
again, we find evidence that the average underpricing for hospitality stocks is higher than that of 
the overall market.  
The explanation for these findings potentially lies in the public and readily identifiable 
nature of hospitality firms and their operations. Hospitality firms are generally easily-identifiable, 
publicly visible companies. While the return potential for a Silicon Valley firm producing 
integrated circuit designs may be quite mysterious for the average investor, many, if not most 
investors, know of P.F. Chang’s (a restaurant company that went public in December 1998). 
Many have patronized the establishment itself and most will find its business model to be 
relatively intuitive. In contrast, consider MKS, a semiconductor manufacturing company listed 
just months after P.F. Chang’s. While MKS may have just as promising a future as P.F. Chang’s, 
it is quite likely that the average investor would find it more difficult to evaluate the future 
prospects of MKS owing to lack of a fundamental knowledge of the semiconductor industry. As a 
result, the information revealed during the bookbuilding process can be less straightforward and 
palatable to investors, resulting in smaller first-day price movements (less than 1% first-day 
return for MKS versus more than 50% for P.F. Chang’s). Note, however, that MKS has 
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performed better than P.F. Chang’s since their IPOs so it is not the case that the value of MKS is 
not eventually revealed.  It just is not revealed as thoroughly in the bookbuilding process.4  
Note also that the majority of firms in our dataset are restaurant firms and that the 
underpricing of restaurant firms is higher than that of hotels, perhaps for the same reason. A large 
proportion of hotel IPOs are actually hotel management firms or REITs, such as LaSalle Hotel 
Properties, Hersha Hospitality, or Red Lion Hotels, all of which were also listed in mid 1998 to 
early 1999. While these firms are surely well-known, well-respected firms in hospitality, they are 
also likely to be less understood by the average investor in the early stages of the company’s 
existence owing to the complexity of the firm’s operations and business models. 
 
3.3. Demand Revelation and Share Allocation 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) find that institutions that reveal more valuable 
information during the registration period are rewarded with higher allocations when 
such information is positive.  Lin et al (2003) further point out that, by only doing so, can 
banks reward investors for telling the truth while simultaneously reducing the total 
underpricing of IPOs, hence maximizing proceeds to issuers.  The intuition for this 
relationship again follows from the 5 rules outlined before.  Since all investors receive 
the same offer price, the only way to reward investors who reveal higher levels of 
demand is to give them more shares. In this way, those who truthfully reveal that they are 
willing to pay a higher price receive more shares as a reward. If investors offer a low 
price in the hopes of generating a weaker book, the resulting offer price may be lower but 
others who bid higher and participants who buy the stock subsequent to the IPO will be 
                                                     
4
 The tech company in the example is a tech manufacturing firm not an internet firm. During this period, 
there was a stock-price bubble and high tech internet firms had extremely high first-day returns. These very 
high returns for internet firms are not typical for most other firms. 
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the ones who benefit. As a result, the discretion given to investment banks to allocate 
more shares to those investors who signal higher levels of demand and to deals with a 
stronger book helps to ensure that all participants tell the truth. As pointed out in Ritter 
and Welch (2002), the share allocation decision is perhaps the most telling and promising 
indication of how banks use and reward investors in the bookbuilding and IPO process. 
The pattern of percent change in shares offered shown in Table 6 is consistent 
with this intuition for the aggregate investor group studied here.  The percent change in 
shares offered is defined as the final number of shares offered less the number of shares 
filed, divided by the number of shares files, and then multiplied by 100.  When the offer 
price is set above (below) the filing range, investors as a whole are rewarded with more 
(fewer) shares. In other words, when bookbuilding is strong, share allocation should be 
larger so as to reward investors involved in bookbuilding for revealing their strong 
demand. Indeed we find that the “Above” group receive a 5% larger allocation whereas 
the “Below” group receives a 6% smaller one.5 As such, for strong deals, a higher offer 
price is struck but investors are rewarded with more shares. For weaker IPOs, investors 
receive smaller allocations of shares but the lower offer price still provides a positive 
first-day return for investors. The pair-wise difference in allocation between the “Above” 
and “Below” groups (11%) is significantly positive. As before, the F-statistics show that 
the trend is monotonically increasing in the revealed demand. In other words, the higher 
the demand, the higher the offer price, the higher the allocation. Again the only exception 
is the Hotel industry, presumably due to the small sample size. Indeed, Table 6 shows 
                                                     
5
 Note that, based on supply/demand arguments alone, a larger allocation of shares would imply greater 
supply and hence a lower price and return. Hence, standard supply/demand arguments do not explain the 
positive relation between share allocation and return. We likewise find that the correlation between the 
percent change in shares offered and the first-day return is positive, indicating that IPOs may be 
oversubscribed.  
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that issues above the filing range are twice as likely to increase in number of shares as 
issues that are within or below the filing range. Deals in the “Above” group increase 
share allocations 52% of the time while decreasing only 7%.  Likewise, issues below the 
filing range will decrease 50% of the time while only increasing 19%.  These findings are 
consistent with the rationale that investors receiver a higher (smaller) allocation and 
hence a higher gross profit (lower loss) when truthfully revealing strong (weak) demand. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the relationship between IPO underpricing and the 
bookbuilding process in the hospitality sector.  Substantial IPO underpricing is 
documented in the hospitality as well as in the Restaurant and Hotel sub-sectors.  This 
underpricing manifests itself as the return provided on the first day of trading subsequent 
to an IPO and serves to provide profit to investors who assisted the investment bank in 
the determination of the final offer price by truthfully revealing their demand.  While this 
underpricing is often considered a cost to the original owners of the firm, both theoretical 
models and empirical evidence exist that suggests that underpricing acts as a necessity of 
the IPO process.  Our study finds that underpricing is related to the information 
revelation process inherent in bookbuilding that occurs prior to the IPO period.  We find 
evidence that investment banks purposefully offer investors a first-day return in order to 
induce them to engage in pre-IPO bidding for shares, a process that banks then use to 
determine the true demand for the IPO.  
 Specifically, investors are willing to truthfully reveal their demand, despite a 
resulting increase in the offer price, because investment banks will purposefully keep the 
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offer price low enough and allocations large enough to generate a substantial first-day 
return for investors.  For strong IPOs, investors reveal strong demand but are rewarded 
with large allocations of shares at an offer price that provides positive gross returns.  For 
weak IPOs, investors likewise tell the truth but receive smaller allocations and very little 
underpricing.  They are rewarded with a small return but, more importantly, will maintain 
a strong relationship with the issuing bank, guaranteeing them future participation in 
potentially better IPOs.  Consistent with this conjecture, we find that underpricing levels 
are significantly positive in general and that underpricing levels and allocations increase 
in the level of demand revealed in the pre-IPO process.  That is, the higher the demand, 
the higher the eventual offer price, the larger the gross first-day returns, and the larger the 
total allocation of shares.  The study further finds that banks are generally unbiased in 
their determination of the filing range as the midpoint of the initial filing range is not 
significantly different from the eventual offer price.  Specifically, we find that: 
1. When truthful revelation of strong demand drives the offer price above the filing 
range, investors receive a 39% first-day return and additional share allocations of 
5.15%. 
2. When truthful revelation of weak demand drives the offer price below the filing 
range, investors receive a 4.64% first-day return and reduced share allocations of -
5.95%. 
When the IPO is weak (strong), a small (large) return is realized and small (large) number 
of shares are allocated.  As such, investors are induced to truthfully reveal their demands, 
even if it eventually drives up the offer price, because they know they will be rewarded 
for doing so with higher returns and larger allocations. We believe these to be strong 
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incentives for truth-telling.  
 This study seeks to add color and clarity to the larger discussion of IPOs.  Equity 
offerings are clearly an important and popular form of financing. Especially in the cash 
intensive sector of hospitality, such sources of capital are many times critical to fund 
growth and expansion.  Though entrepreneurs or private firm managers may at first prefer 
not to see any underpricing and would likewise prefer not to deliver a large fee/gross 
spread to the investment bank, it is often unavoidable.  Investment banks offer the 
important service of bridging the information gap between managers and the capital 
market, and underpricing is a necessary part of the IPO process as it provides incentive 
for the capital market to reveal their demand for the issuing firm’s stock. 
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Table 1: Hospitality IPO Market 
This table shows the the number of IPOs, and the average value of IPOs in thousands of dollars by year 
and over various periods for the hospitality sector as a whole and for the restaurant and hotel sectors 
separately. The offer value is the product of the offer price per share and the number of shares offered.  
The averages over the various periods are computed across the IPOs issued over that period.  For example, 
the average offer value for the 1981-1989 period was computed as the average across all IPOs issued over 
the 1981-1989 period. 
  Hospitality Restaurants Hotels 
  Number   Number   Number   
Year of IPOs  Average Offer Value  of IPOs  Average Offer Value  of IPOs  Average Offer Value  
  
  ($ 000)   ($ 000)   ($ 000) 
1981 4 $8,984.00 4 $8,984.00 0   
1982 8 $7,525.16 8 $7,525.16 0   
1983 15 $9,747.51 15 $9,747.51 0   
1984 9 $16,236.78 7 $13,079.07 2 $54,577.50 
1985 4 $9,057.81 3 $8,077.08 1 $12,000.00 
1986 3 $32,453.00 2 $36,679.50 1 $24,000.00 
1987 4 $44,562.62 2 $24,775.00 2 $128,700.46 
1988 0   0   0   
1989 1 $26,175.00 1 $26,175.00 0   
1990 0   0   0   
1991 5 $28,430.00 5 $28,430.00 0   
1992 10 $27,103.93 8 $26,527.41 2 $58,820.00 
1993 11 $34,282.71 6 $24,279.17 5 $231,434.82 
1994 10 $31,138.05 6 $19,114.58 4 $196,693.00 
1995 6 $48,716.67 4 $21,375.00 2 $206,800.00 
1996 20 $53,992.38 11 $21,146.36 9 $847,237.50 
1997 6 $27,231.25 3 $23,800.00 3 $91,987.50 
1998 2 $63,712.50 1 $49,800.00 1 $77,625.00 
1999 2 $34,992.53 2 $34,992.53 0   
2000 0   0   0   
2001 3 $73,463.59 3 $73,463.59 0   
1981-2001 123 $30,744.00 91 $20,347.65 32 $60,308.62 
1981-1989 48 $15,135.35 42 $12,076.63 6 $36,546.33 
1990-2001 75 $40,733.54 49 $27,437.09 26 $65,792.22 
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Table 2: Variables of Interest Related to the Determination of Whether the Filing Range is an 
Unbiased Assessment of the Offer Price 
This table presents the values of various variables of interest related to the determination of whether the 
initial filing offer range reported in the prospectus is an unbiased assessment of the final offer price in 
which shares are offered to regular investors.  The values are reported for the hospitality industry as a 
whole as well as for two sub-samples: restaurants and hotels. For each of these three data samples, the 
results are presented across all IPOs (Column (1)) and for three sub-samples that were determined based 
upon the categorization of the relationship between the offer price and the filing range. The IPOs included 
in Column (2) represent those in which the offer price was set below the offer range; Column (3) represent 
those in which the offer price was set within the offer range; and Column (4) represent those in which the 
offer price was set above the offer range. The dollar width of the filing range was computed as the high 
price in the offer range minus the low price; the percent width of the offer range  was computed as the 
dollar width divided by the low price multiplied by 100; the midpoint of the offer range is the average of 
the high and low prices of the offer range; the offer price revision was computed as the offer price less the 
midpoint of the filing range; and the percentage offer price revision was computed as the difference 
between the offer price and the midpoint of the filing range divided by the midpoint of the filing range 
multiplied by 100.The means are computed by first computing the value of the variable for each IPO and 
then averaging these values across the IPOs in each sample. For example, for the mean percentage offer 
price revision, first the percentage difference was computed for each IPO and then the average was taken 
of these computed values across the IPOs. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. It also shows the 
number of IPOs in each sample and the percentage of the IPOs in each of the three groups categorized by 
the relationship between the final offer price and the filing range. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Table 2 Panel A: Hospitality 
    IPOs Categorized According to: 
  All Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
  IPOs Below Filing Range Within Filing Range Above Filing Range 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Dollar width of offer range $1.93 $1.97 $1.90 $1.98 
   Percent width of offer range 19.02% 18.11% 19.53% 18.87% 
   Midpoint of offer range $11.63 $12.52 $11.06 $11.94 
   Actual offer price $11.52 $9.98 $10.96 $14.70 
   Offer price revision -$0.11 -$2.55 -$0.11 $2.77 
     (t-statistic) (-0.58) (-12.35) (-1.10) (10.66) 
   Percentage offer price revision -1.07% -21.20% -1.49% 23.80% 
     (t-statistic) (-0.65) (-12.04) (-1.63) (10.28) 
Number of IPOs 123 32 64 27 
Percentage of IPOs 100% 26% 52% 22% 
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Table 2 Continued: Variables of Interest Related to the Determination of Whether the Filing Range 
is an Unbiased Assessment of the Offer Price 
Table 2 Panel B: Restaurants 
    IPOs Categorized According to: 
  All Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
  IPOs Below Filing Range Within Filing Range Above Filing Range 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Dollar width of offer range $1.90 $1.96 $1.83 $1.98 
   Percent width of offer range 19.39% 18.11% 20.00% 19.66% 
   Midpoint of offer range $11.09 $12.19 $10.31 $11.41 
   Actual offer price $10.93 $9.61 $10.24 $14.20 
   Offer price revision -$0.16 -$2.59 -$0.07 $2.79 
     (t-statistic) (-0.70) (-11.15) (-0.61) (8.60) 
   Percentage offer price revision -1.28% -21.73% -1.11% 24.93% 
     (t-statistic) (-0.64) (-11.78) (-0.97) (8.47) 
Number of IPOs 91 26 45 20 
Percentage of IPOs 100% 29% 49% 22% 
Table 2 Panel C: Hotels 
    IPOs Categorized According to: 
  All Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
  IPOs Below Filing Range Within Filing Range Above Filing Range 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Dollar width of offer range $2.03 $2.00 $2.05 $2.00 
   Percent width of offer range 17.98% 18.11% 18.43% 16.63% 
   Midpoint of offer range $13.18 $13.96 $12.84 $13.43 
   Actual offer price $13.21 $11.58 $12.64 $16.14 
   Offer price revision $0.03 -$2.38 -$0.20 $2.71 
     (t-statistic) (0.09) (-4.93) (-1.02) (6.45) 
   Percentage offer price revision -0.47% -18.88% -2.40% 20.57% 
     (t-statistic) (-0.17) (-3.60) (-1.60) (6.93) 
Number of IPOs 32 6 19 7 
Percentage of IPOs 100% 19% 59% 22% 
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Table 3: IPO Underpricing 
This table presents the IPO underpricing for the hospitality industry as a whole as well as for two subsamples: restaurants and 
hotels. For each of these three data samples, the results are presented across all IPOs,Column (1) and for three subsamples that were 
determined based upon the categorization of the relationship between the offer price and the filing range. The IPOs included in 
Column (2) represent those in which the offer price was set below the offer range; Column (3) represent those in which the offer 
price was set within the offer range; and Column (4) represent those in which the offer price was set above the offer range.  
Underpricing is defined as the first day return, that is: P1/Po -1 where P1 is the first-day closing price and Po is the offer price. A 
mean-difference test of Above-Below underpricing, Column (5) shows that the Above mean is significantly higher than the Below 
mean and, an F-test of equality, Column (6), confirms inequality of means across the three filing range groups. 
      
 
  
Hospitality 
   IPOs Categorized According to: Underpricing F-test 
  All Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price Difference of Equality 
  IPOs Below Filing Range Within Filing Range Above Filing Range Above-Below of Means 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (5) 
Mean Underpricing 17.10% 4.64% 13.92% 39.41% 34.77%   
    (t-stat) (7.45) (1.47) (5.20) (7.17) (5.49) (19.06) 
    p-value <0.0001 0.1518 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
    % > 0 85% 78% 83% 100% 
  
  
Number of Observations 123 32 64 27 
  
  
Restaurants 
Mean Underpricing 17.13% 2.90% 15.08% 40.24% 37.34%   
    (t-stat) (6.48) (2.07) (4.40) (6.12) (5.55) (17.31) 
    p-value <0.0001 0.0487 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
    % > 0 87% 85% 82% 100% 
  
  
Number of Observations 91 26 45 20 
  
  
Hotels 
Mean Underpricing 17.03% 12.16% 11.20% 37.03% 24.87%   
    (t-stat) (3.63) (0.74) (2.82) (3.50) (1.27) (2.84) 
    p-value 0.001 0.4948 0.0114 0.0129 0.2377 0.0745 
    % > 0 81% 50% 84% 100% 
  
  
Number of Observations 32 6 19 7 
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Table 4: IPO Under-pricing 
This table presents IPO under-pricing for the overall market, the hospitality industry and the casino industry over various periods.  Column (1) 
lists the reference for the studies of the overall market (Column(3))and of the casino industry (Column(5)). Column (2) shows the time period 
for which the average underpricing was computed in each of the referenced studies. Column (4) shows the average underpricing for the 
hopitality IPOs included in this study's data sample over the same period as for the overall market and the casino industry. 
    Mean Underpricing 
    Overall      
Reference Period Market Hospitality Casino 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
         
Stangeland, David A. and Steven Zheng, 2007 1982-1998 12.91% 17.47%   
 
        
Krigman, Laurie, Wayne H. Shaw, and Kent L. Womack, 1999 1988-1995 12.30% 26.97%   
 
        
Loughran, Tim and Jay R. Ritter, 2002 1990-1998 14.80% 22.14%   
  
       
Atkinson, S.M.; LeBruto, S.M, 1995 1992-1993   36.77% 30.63% 
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Table 5: IPO Under-pricing 
This table presents the IPO under-pricing for the overall market and for hospitality industry 
as a whole over the 1983-1987 period. For each of these two data samples, the results are 
presented for three subsamples that were determined based upon the categorization of the 
relationship between the offer price and the filing range. The results presented in Column (1) 
are from the study by Hanley (1993). Column (2) present the results over the 1983-1987 
period from the hospitality data sample used in this study. The IPOs included in the row 
entitled "Below Filing Range" represent those in which the offer price was set below the 
offer range; the IPOs included in the row entitled "Within Filing Range"represent those in 
which the offer price was set within the offer range; and the IPOs included in the row entitled 
"Above Filing Range" represent those in which the offer price was set above the offer range. 
  Mean Underpricing 1983-1987 
  Hanley, Kathleen Weiss, 1993   
Offer Price Overall Market Hospitality 
  (1) (2) 
Below Filing Range 0.60% 0.32% 
Within Filing Range 10.00% 11.89% 
Above Filing Range 20.70% 30.26% 
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Table 6: Share Allocation 
This table presents the percentage change in share allocation for the hospitality industry as a whole as well as for two subsamples: 
restaurants and hotels. For each of these three data samples, the results are presented across all IPOs, Column (1) and for three 
subsamples that were determined based upon the categorization of the relationship between the offer price and the filing range. The 
IPOs included in Column (2) represent those in which the offer price was set below the offer range; Column (3) represent those in which 
the offer price was set within the offer range; and Column (4) represent those in which the offer price was set above the offer range.  The 
percentage change in share allocation is defined as the number of shares sold minus the number of shares filed divided by the number of 
shares filed multiplied by 100. A mean-difference test of Above-Below underpricing, Column (5), shows that the Above mean is 
significantly higher than the Below mean and, an F-test of equality, Column (6) confirms inequality of means, across the three filing 
range groups. 
              
Hospitality 
    IPOs Categorized According to: % Change in Shares F-test 
  All Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price Difference of Equality 
  IPOs Below Filing Range Within Filing Range Above Filing Range Above-Below of Means 
Mean % Change in Shares 1.20% -5.95% 3.11% 5.15% 11.10%   
    (t-stat) (0.99) (2.14) (1.95) (3.09) (3.42) (6.91) 
    p-value 0.3237 0.0407 0.0555 0.0047 0.0013 0.0014 
    % > 0 30% 19% 27% 52% 
  
  
    % < 0 18% 50% 6% 7% 
  
  
    % = 0 52% 31% 67% 41% 
  
  
Number of Observations 123 32 64 27 
  
  
Restaurants 
Mean % Change in Shares 1.65% -6.60% 4.46% 6.07% 12.67%   
    (t-stat) (1.05) (2.01) (2.07) (2.99) (3.28) (6.22) 
    p-value 0.2961 0.0554 0.0445 0.0076 0.0021 0.0030 
    % > 0 34% 19% 33% 55% 
  
  
    % < 0 19% 50% 7% 5% 
  
  
    % = 0 47% 31% 60% 40% 
  
  
Number of Observations 91 26 45 20 
  
  
Hotels 
Mean % Change in Shares -0.08% -3.07% -0.09% 2.52% 5.59%   
    (t-stat) (0.06) (0.69) (0.06) (0.93) (1.07) (0.88) 
    p-value 0.953 0.5224 0.9514 0.3901 0.3148 0.4254 
    % > 0 19% 17% 11% 43% 
  
  
    % < 0 16% 50% 5% 14% 
  
  
    % = 0 66% 33% 84% 43% 
  
  
Number of Observations 32 6 19 7 
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